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Abstract
This paper considers a stochastic Nash game in which each player i minimizes a composite objec-
tive fi(x) + ri(xi), where fi is an expectation-valued smooth function and ri is a nonsmooth convex
function with an efficient prox-evaluation. In this context, we make the following contributions. (I)
Under suitable monotonicity assumptions on the concatenated gradient map of fi, we derive (opti-
mal) rate statements and oracle complexity bounds for the proposed variable sample-size proximal
stochastic gradient-response (VS-PGR) scheme when the sample-size increases at a geometric rate.
If the sample-size increases at a polynomial rate of d(k + 1)ve with v > 0, the mean-squared error of
the iterates decays at a corresponding polynomial rate while the iteration and oracle complexities to
obtain an -Nash equilibrium (NE) are O(1/1/v) and O(1/1+1/v), respectively. (II) We then overlay
(VS-PGR) with a consensus phase with a view towards developing distributed protocols for aggrega-
tive stochastic Nash games. In the resulting (d-VS-PGR) scheme, when the sample-size and the
number of consensus steps at each iteration grow at a geometric and linear rate respectively while
the communication rounds grow at the rate of k + 1, computing an -NE requires similar iteration
and oracle complexities to (VS-PGR) with a communication complexity of O(ln2(1/)); (III) Under
a suitable contractive property associated with the proximal best-response (BR) map, we design a
variable sample-size proximal BR (VS-PBR) scheme, where each player solves a sample-average BR
problem. When the sample-size increases at a suitable geometric rate, the resulting iterates converge
at a geometric rate while the iteration and oracle complexity are respectively O(ln(1/)) and O(1/); If
the sample-size increases at a polynomial rate with degree v, the mean-squared error decays at a corre-
sponding polynomial rate while the iteration and oracle complexities are O(1/1/v) and O(1/1+1/v),
respectively. (IV) Akin to (II), the distributed variant (d-VS-PBR) achieves similar iteration and
oracle complexities to the centralized (VS-PBR) with a communication complexity of O(ln2(1/))
when the communication rounds per iteration increase at the rate of k + 1. Finally, we present some
preliminary numerics to provide empirical support for the rate and complexity statements.
1 Introduction
Noncooperative game-theoretic models [5, 11] consider the resolution of conflicts among selfish players,
each of which tries to optimize its payoff, given its rival strategies. Nash games, an important subclass of
noncooperative games originating from the seminal work by [31], have seen wide applicability in a breadth
of engineered systems, such as power grids, communication networks, and transportation networks (see
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e.g. [2, 4,35,36,42]). Recently, there has been an interest in “designing” games to effect distributed con-
trol [3,30]; consequently, in networked regimes, the role of distributed protocols for computing equilibria
over graphs is of increasing relevance.
In this paper, we consider the Nash equilibrium problem (NEP) with a finite set of n players indexed
by i where i ∈ N , {1, · · · , n}. For any i ∈ N , the ith player is characterized by a strategy xi ∈ Rdi
and a payoff function Fi(xi, x−i) dependent on its strategy xi and the rival strategies x−i , {xj}j 6=i.
Let x denote the strategy profile, defined as x , (x1, · · · , xn) ∈ Rd with d ,
∑n
i=1 di. We consider a
stochastic Nash game P where the objective of player i, given its rival strategies x−i, is to solve the
following parametrized stochastic optimization problem:
min
xi∈Rdi
Fi(xi, x−i) , fi(xi, x−i) + ri(xi), (Pi(x−i))
where fi(x) , E [ψi(x; ξ(ω))], the random variable ξ : Ω → Rm is defined on the probability space
(Ω,F ,P), ψi : Rd×Rm → R is a scalar-valued function, and E[·] denotes the expectation with respect to
the probability measure P. We focus on structured nonsmooth convex Nash games where fi(xi, x−i) is
assumed to be smooth and convex in xi for any x−i while ri(xi) is assumed to be a convex but possibly
nonsmooth function with an efficient prox-evaluation. Note that the function ri(·) allows for incorporating
convex constraints by defining ri(xi) as the indicator function of a convex set. A Nash equilibrium (NE)
of the stochastic Nash game in which the ith player solves the parametrized problem (Pi(x−i)) is a tuple
x∗ , {x∗i }ni=1 ∈ Rd such that for any i ∈ N ,
Fi(x
∗
i , x
∗
−i) ≤ Fi(xi, x∗−i) ∀xi ∈ Rdi .
In other words, x∗ is an NE if no player can profit from unilaterally deviating from its equilibrium strategy
x∗i .
Our focus is two-fold: (i) Development of variable sample-size stochastic proximal gradient-response
(VS-PGR) and proximal best-response((VS-PBR) schemes with optimal (deterministic) rates of
convergence as well as iteration and oracle complexities; (ii) Extension to distributed (consensus-based)
regimes (referred to as (d-VS-PGR) and (d-VS-PBR)), allowing for resolving aggregative stochastic
Nash games where each player’s payoff depends on its strategy and an aggregate of all players’ strate-
gies over a static communication graph, where linear rates of convergence are achieved by combining
increasing number of consensus steps with a growing batch-size of sampled gradients or payoffs.
Prior research. We discuss some relevant prior research on gradient-response, best-response, and
distributed schemes for continuous-strategy Nash games and variance-reduced schemes for stochastic
optimization.
(i) Gradient-response schemes. Early work considered convex Nash games where player problems are
convex and that an NE [8, Chapter 1] is equivalent to a solution of the associated variational inequality.
Gradient-response schemes have proven useful in flow control and routing games (see, e.g. [1,36,43]) and
generally impose a suitable monotonicity property on the concatenated gradient map. Merely monotone
problems have been addressed via iterative regularization in deterministic [20, 43] and stochastic [21]
regimes. Extensions have been developed to contend with misspecification [18] and the lack of Lipschitzian
properties [44].
(ii) Best-response schemes. By observing that an NE is a fixed point of the BR map for convex Nash
games (cf. [5]) we may apply fixed-point or BR approaches, where each player selects the strategy that
optimizes its payoff, given rival strategies (cf. [5,10]). There have been efforts to extend such schemes to
engineered settings (cf. [39]), where the BR correspondence can be expressed in a closed form. However,
BR schemes do not always lead to convergence to Nash equilibria even in potential convex Nash games
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(see [9] for a counterexample). The proximal BR schemes appear to have been first discussed in [7]
where it is shown that the set of fixed points of the proximal BR map is equivalent to the set of Nash
equilibria. In [9], several regularized Gauss-Seidel BR schemes are suggested for generalized potential
games and it is shown that a limit point of the generated sequence is an NE. More recently, sampled
BR schemes have been developed [37] to solve risk-averse two-stage noncooperative games while the
rate statements and complexity bounds have been provided for a distinctly different class (specifically
single-loop) of inexact synchronous, asynchronous, and delay-tolerant stochastic proximal BR schemes
in [26,29,41]. We emphasize that in this scheme, each strongly convex expectation-valued subproblem is
solved by a stochastic gradient scheme and the overall iteration complexity in terms of projected gradient
steps is O(1/), in contrast with O(ln(1/)) complexity obtained in the present work, albeit in terms of
sample-average subproblems. Finally, a.s. and mean convergence of sequences produced by proximal BR
schemes is shown in [25,26] for stochastic and misspecified potential games.
(iii) Consensus-based distributed schemes for Nash games. Aggregative games [17] are Nash games
where player payoffs are coupled through an aggregate of player strategies; however, players might not
have access to the aggregate and hence cannot compute payoffs or gradients, precluding the direct use of
gradient/BR schemes. Inspired by the consensus-based protocols for distributed optimization [15,23,24,
32,33], Koshal et al. [22] developed distributed synchronous and asynchronous algorithms for such games
in which players utilize an estimate of the aggregate and update it by communicating with their neighbors.
Deterministic aggregative games subject to coupling constraints are considered in [6,34], while in [34], an
asymmetric projection algorithm is adopted for seeking a variational generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE).
In [6], non-differentiable payoff functions are considered and a semi-decentralized algorithm is presented
for finding a zero of the associated generalized equation. However, in both [6] and [34], an additional
central node is required for updating the Lagrange multiplier associated with the coupling constraints.
Distributed primal-dual algorithms were proposed in deterministic regimes [46] while the only known
distributed gradient-based scheme for generalized stochastic Nash games was developed in [45], which
considers asymptotic behavior under a constant steplength. We focus on stochastic aggregative Nash
games but consider both gradient and BR schemes while providing rate and complexity guarantees.
(iv) Variance reduction schemes. There has been an effort to utilize variance reduction schemes
for solving stochastic programs within stochastic gradient-based schemes, where the true gradient is
replaced by the average of an increasing batch of sampled gradients, leading to a progressive reduction
of the variance of the sample-average gradient. Thus, such schemes can improve the rates of convergence
or even allow for recovering deterministic convergence rates (in an expected value sense) if the batch size
grows sufficiently fast, as seen in convex [12,13,16,19,40] and nonconvex optimization regimes [12,28,38].
However, there has been no known effort to apply such avenues for resolving stochastic Nash games,
particularly via BR schemes.
Research Gaps and Novelty of Proposed Research. Prior algorithmic research on stochastic
Nash games has largely resided in standard gradient-based approaches (without utilizing variance re-
duction) with either little or no available rate and complexity analysis for either best-response schemes
or distributed variants for both gradient or best-response schemes. In addition, much of the prior rate
statements show distinct gaps with deterministic analogs. In this paper, we address the following gaps:
(i) Best-response schemes. We provide a novel best-response scheme that can address stochastic Nash
games characterized by a suitable contractive property; (ii) Variance-reduction schemes. By overlaying a
variable sample-size framework, we observe that both gradient and best-response schemes achieve deter-
ministic rates of convergence with optimal or near-optimal oracle complexities; (iii) Distributed variants.
Finally, we then proceed to extend each scheme to a distributed regime capable of contending with ag-
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Algorithm Sk Rate E[‖xk − x∗‖2] Iter. Comp. Oracle Comp. Assump.
VS-PGR
dρ−(k+1)e Linear: O(ρk) O(ln(1/)) O(1/) SM
d(k + 1)ve O(qk) +O(k−v) O((1/)1/v) O(1/)(1+1/v) SM
VS-PBR
dρ−(k+1)e O(ρk) O(ln(1/)) O(1/) CPBRM
d(k + 1)ve O(ak) +O(k−v) O(1/1/v) O(1/1+1/v) CPBRM
Table 1: (VS-PGR) and (VS-PBR) schemes (v > 0, SM: Strongly monotone, CPBRM: Contract. prox.
BR Map)
Algorithm Sk Comm. τk Rate E[‖xk − x∗‖2] Iter. Comp. Oracle Comp. Comm. Comp. Assump.
d-VS-PGR
dρ−(k+1)e k + 1 Linear: O(ρk) O(ln(1/)) O(1/) O(ln2(1/)) SM
d(k + 1)ve d(k + 1)ue O((k + 1)−v) O((1/)1/v) O((1/)1+1/v) O((1/)(1+u)/v) SM
d-VS-PBR
dρ−(k+1)e k + 1 Linear: O(ρk) O(ln(1/)) O(1/) O(ln2(1/)) CPBRM
d(k + 1)ve d(k + 1)ue O((k + 1)−v) O((1/)1/v) O((1/)1+1/v) O((1/)(1+u)/v) CPBRM
Table 2: (d-VS-PGR) and (d-VS-PBR) schemes for Aggregative games (v > 0, u ∈ (0, 1))
gregative Nash games and prove that under suitable communication requirements, the aforementioned
geometric rates of convergence can be retained.
Contributions. We summarize the key aspects of our schemes in Tables 1– 2 and elaborate on these
next.
(i). VS-PGR. In Section 2.1, we propose a variable sample-size proximal gradient response (VS-
PGR) scheme, where in each iteration an increasing batch of sampled gradients is utilized. Under a
strong monotonicity assumption, the mean-squared error admits a linear rate of convergence (Th. 1)
when batch-sizes increase geometrically. We further show in Th. 2 that the iteration complexity (no. of
proximal evaluations) and oracle complexity (no. of sampled gradients) to achieve an −NE denoted by
x satisfying E[‖x − x∗‖2] ≤  are respectively O(ln(1/)) and O ((1/)1+δ) with δ ≥ 0. In Cor. 1, with
a suitable choice of algorithmic parameters, the iteration and oracle complexity to obtain an −NE are
shown to be optimal and are bounded by O(κ2 ln(1/)) and by O (κ2/), where κ denotes the condition
number. Finally, under a polynomially increasing sample-size d(k+1)ve, v > 0, we show in Lemma 1 that
E[‖xk − x∗‖2] = O (k−v) +O
(
qk
)
(where q < 1), and establish that the iteration and oracle complexity
to obtain an −NE are O((1/)1/v) and O ((1/)1+1/v), respectively.
(ii). Distributed VS-PGR. In Section 2.2, we design a distributed VS-PGR scheme (see Alg. 1) to
compute an NE of an aggregative stochastic Nash game over a static communication graph where players
combine variance reduced proximal gradient response with a consensus update for learning the aggregate.
By suitably increasing the number of consensus steps and sample-size at each iteration, this scheme is
characterized by a linear rate of convergence (Th. 3) while in Th. 4 and Cor. 2, the iteration, oracle, and
communication complexity to compute an -NE are proven to be O(ln(1/)), O (1/), and O (ln2(1/)),
respectively. With polynomially increasing communication rounds d(k + 1)ue and sample-size d(k + 1)ve
for u ∈ (0, 1) and v > 0, we can obtain a polynomial convergence rate E[‖xk−x∗‖2] = O (k−v) associated
with the iteration, communication, and oracle complexity to obtain an −NE bounded by O((1/)1/v),
O((1/)(u+1)/v), and O ((1/)1+1/v), respectively.
(iii). VS-PBR. In Section 3.2, we develop a variable sample-size proximal best-response (VS-PBR)
scheme (see Alg. 2) when the proximal BR map is contractive and requires that each player solves a
sample-average BR problem per step. In Th. 5, we show that the generated iterates converge to the
NE at a linear rate in the mean-squared sense when the sample-size for computing the sample-average
payoff increases geometrically, leading to an iteration (no. of deterministic opt problems solved) and
oracle complexity (no. of samples) to achieve an −NE of O(ln(1/)) and O(1/) respectively. Akin to
Section 2.1, we show in Cor. 4 that when the sample-size increases at a polynomial rate of d(k + 1)ve,
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E[‖xk − x∗‖2] = O (k−v) +O
(
ak
)
(where a < 1) with the iteration and oracle complexities bounded by
O(1/1/v) and O(1/1+1/v), respectively.
(iv). Distributed VS-PBR. In Section 3.3, we design a distributed VS-PBR scheme (see Alg. 3)
to compute an NE of an aggregative Nash game with contractive proximal BR maps, akin to (d-VS-
PGR) where the aggregate is estimated by taking multiple consensus steps while the proximal BR is
approximated by solving a sample-average best-response problem. When the number of consensus steps
and sample-sizes are raised suitably fast, the mean-squared error diminishes at a geometric rate (Prop. 4).
We further show in Th. 6 that the iteration, oracle, and communication complexity to compute an -NE
are O(ln(1/)), O (1/), and O (ln2(1/)), respectively.
Notation: A vector x is assumed to be a column vector while xT denotes its transpose. ‖x‖ denotes
the Euclidean vector norm, i.e., ‖x‖ =
√
xTx. We write a.s. for “almost surely” and for x ∈ R, dxe
denotes the smallest integer greater than x. For a closed convex function r(·), the prox. operator is
defined by (1) for α > 0:
proxαr(x) , argmin
y
(
r(y) +
1
2α
‖y − x‖2
)
. (1)
2 VS-PGR Scheme and the Distributed Variant
This section considers the development of a variable sample-size proximal stochastic gradient-response
scheme for a class of strongly monotone Nash games. We derive rate and complexity statements when
players can observe rival strategies in Section 2.1 and provide analogous statements for a distributed
variant in Section 2.2 for an aggregative game where players overlay an additional consensus phase for
learning the aggregate
2.1 Variable sample-size proximal stochastic gradient-response scheme
We impose the following conditions on P.
Assumption 1 (i) ri is lower semicontinuous and convex with effective domain denoted by Ri ,
dom(ri). (ii) For every fixed x−i ∈ R−i ,
∏
j 6=iRj, fi(xi, x−i) is C1 and convex in xi ∈ Ri; (iii)
For all x−i ∈ R−i and any ξ ∈ Rm, ψi(xi, x−i; ξ) is differentiable in xi ∈ Ri such that ∇xifi(xi, x−i) =
E[∇xiψi(xi, x−i; ξ)].
Define G(x; ξ) ,
(∇xiψi(x; ξ))ni=1 and G(x) , E[G(x; ξ)]. Then G(x) = (∇xifi(x))ni=1 by Assumption
1(iii). The following lemma establishes that a tuple x∗ is an NE if and only if it is a fixed point of a
suitable map.
Lemma 1 (Equivalence between NE and fixed point of proximal response map) Given the stochas-
tic Nash game P, suppose Assumption 1 holds for each player i ∈ N . Let r(x) , (ri(xi))ni=1. Then x∗ ∈ X
is an NE if and only if x∗ is a fixed point of proxαr(x− αG(x)), i.e.,
x∗ = proxαr(x
∗ − αG(x∗)), ∀α > 0. (2)
Proof. Note that for any i ∈ N , fi(xi, x∗−i) and ri(xi) is convex in xi. Then x∗i is an optimal solution of
fi(xi, x
∗
−i) + ri(xi) if and only if the following holds for any α > 0 :
x∗i = proxαri(x
∗
i − α∇xifi(x∗)). (3)
Then by concatenating (3) for i = 1, · · · , n, we obtain Equation (2). 2
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Suppose the iteration index is given by k. Player i at iteration k holds an estimate xi,k ∈ Rdi of
the equilibrium strategy x∗i . We consider a variable sample-size generalization of the standard proximal
stochastic gradient method, in which Sk number of sampled gradients are utilized at iteration k. For
any i ∈ N , given Sk realizations ∇xiψi(xk; ξ1k), . . . , ∇xiψi(xk; ξSkk ) , xi,0 ∈ Ri, player i updates xi,k+1 as
follows:
xi,k+1 = proxαri
[
xi,k − α
Sk
Sk∑
p=1
∇xiψi(xk; ξpk)
]
, (4)
where α > 0 is the step size. If wpk , G(xk; ξ
p
k)−G(xk) and w¯k,Sk , 1Sk
∑Sk
p=1w
p
k, then by concatenating
(4) for i = 1, · · · , n, we obtain the compact form:
xk+1 = proxαr [xk − α (G(xk) + w¯k,Sk)] . (VS-PGR)
We impose the following conditions on the gradient mapping G(x) and noise w¯k,Sk and rely on Fk, defined
as Fk , σ{x0, x1, · · · , xk}.
Assumption 2 (i) G(x) is L-Lipschitz continuous, i.e., ‖G(x)−G(y)‖ ≤ L‖x−y‖, ∀x, y ∈ R, Πnj=1Rj .
(ii) G(x) is η-strongly monotone, i.e., (G(x)−G(y))T (x− y) ≥ η‖x− y‖2, ∀x, y ∈ R. (iii) There exists
a constant ν > 0 such that for any k ≥ 0, E[w¯k,Sk | Fk] = 0, a.s. and E[‖w¯k,Sk‖2 | Fk] ≤ ν2/Sk, a.s..
We now establish a simple recursion for the conditional mean-squared error in terms of sample size
Sk, step size α, and the problem parameters.
Lemma 2 Consider (VS-PGR) and suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then
E[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2|Fk] ≤
(
1− 2αη + α2L2) ‖xk − x∗‖2 + α2ν2
Sk
, ∀k ≥ 0, a.s. . (5)
Proof. Consider the reformulation (VS-PGR). By using the nonexpansive property of the proximal
operator and Eqn. (2), ‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 can be bounded as follows:
‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 =
∥∥proxαr [xk − α (G(xk) + w¯k,Sk)]− proxαr [x∗ − αG(x∗)]∥∥2
≤ ∥∥xk − x∗ − α (G(xk)−G(x∗) + w¯k,Sk) ∥∥2
≤ ‖xk − x∗‖2 − 2α (G(xk)−G(x∗))T (xk − x∗) + α2 ‖G(xk)−G(x∗)‖2
− 2α(xk − x∗)T w¯k,Sk + 2α2 (G(xk)−G(x∗))T w¯k,Sk + α2‖w¯k,Sk‖2.
Then by taking expectations conditioned on Fk on both sides of the above inequality, recalling that xk
is adapted to Fk, and by invoking Assumption 2, it follows that Eqn. (5) holds. 2
2.1.1 Geometrically Increasing Sample Sizes
We begin with a preliminary lemma that will be used in the rate analysis.
Lemma 3 Let the sequence {vk}k≥0 with initial value v0 ≤ c0 satisfy the following recursion (6) for
some q, ρ ∈ (0, 1):
vk+1 ≤ qvk + c1ρk+1 ∀k ≥ 0. (6)
Then for any k ≥ 0, (i) vk ≤
(
c0 +
c1
max{q/ρ,ρ/q}−1
)
max{ρ, q}k when ρ 6= q; (ii) vk ≤
(
c0 +
c1
ln((q˜/q)e)
)
q˜k
for any q˜ ∈ (q, 1) when ρ = q.
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Proof. Based on (6), we obtain that
vk+1 ≤ qk+1v0 + c1
k+1∑
m=1
qk+1−mρm. (7)
(i) Consider q 6= ρ. For ρ < q, we obtain the following bound:
k∑
m=1
qk+1−mρm = qk+1
k∑
m=1
(ρ/q)m ≤ ρ/q
1− ρ/q q
k =
1
q/ρ− 1q
k+1.
Similarly,
∑k
m=1 q
k+1−mρm ≤ 1ρ/q−1ρk+1 when q < ρ. Therefore,
∑k
m=1 q
k+1−mρm = max{ρ,q}
k
max{q/ρ,ρ/q}−1 when
ρ 6= q. Hence by (7) and v0 ≤ c0, (i) follows.
(ii) Consider ρ = q. Recall from [29, Lemma 2] that kqk ≤ q˜k/ ln((q˜/q)e) for any q˜ ∈ (q, 1). This together
with (7) implies that vk≤q
kc0+c1kqk≤c0+c1
ln((q˜/q)e))q˜k.
2
Based on Lemmas 2 and 3, we proceed to prove the linear convergence of the iterates generated by
(VS-PGR) in a mean-squared sense with geometrically increasing batch-size.
Theorem 1 (Linear convergence rate of VS-PGR) Let (VS-PGR) be applied to P, where Sk ,⌈
ρ−(k+1)
⌉
for some ρ ∈ (0, 1) and E[‖x0−x∗‖2] ≤ C for some C > 0. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold.
Let α ∈ (0, 2η/L2) and q , 1− 2αη + α2L2. Then the following hold for any k ≥ 0.
(i) If ρ 6= q, then E[‖xk − x∗‖2] ≤ C(ρ, q) max{ρ, q}k where C(ρ, q) , C + α2ν2max{ρ/q,q/ρ}−1 .
(ii) If ρ = q, then for any q˜ ∈ (q, 1), E[‖xk − x∗‖2] ≤ D˜q˜k, where D˜ , C + α2ν2ln((q˜/q)e) .
Proof. By definition, q ∈ (0, 1) when α ∈ (0, 2η/L2). Then by taking unconditional expectations on
both sides of Eqn. (5) and using Sk =
⌈
ρ−(k+1)
⌉
, we obtain that for any k ≥ 0, E[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2] ≤
qE[‖xk − x∗‖2] + α2ν2ρk+1. Then by using Lemma 3, we obtain the results. 2
Next, we examine the iteration (no. of prox. evals.) and oracle complexity (no. of sampled gradients)
of (VS-PGR) to compute an -Nash equilibrium. We refer to a random strategy profile x : Ω → Rn as
an −NE if E[‖x− x∗‖2] ≤ .
Theorem 2 (Iteration and Oracle Complexity) Let (VS-PGR) be applied to P, where Sk =
⌈
ρ−(k+1)
⌉
for some ρ ∈ (0, 1) and E[‖x0 − x∗‖2] ≤ C for some C > 0. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Let
α ∈ (0, 2η/L2) and define q , 1− 2αη + α2L2. Set q˜ ∈ (q, 1). Then the number of proximal evaluations
needed to obtain an −NE is bounded by K(), defined as
K() ,

1
ln(1/q) ln
((
C + α
2ν2ρ
q−ρ
)
−1
)
if ρ < q < 1,
1
ln(1/q˜) ln
((
C + α
2ν2
ln((q˜/q)e)
)
−1
)
if q = ρ,
1
ln(1/ρ) ln
((
C + α
2ν2q
ρ−q
)
−1
)
if q < ρ < 1,
(8)
and the number of sampled gradients required is bounded by M(), defined as
M() ,

1
ρ ln(1/ρ)
((
C + α
2ν2ρ
q−ρ
)
−1
) ln(1/ρ)
ln(1/q)
+K() if ρ < q < 1,
1
q ln(1/q)
((
C + α
2ν2
ln((q˜/q)e)
)
−1
) ln(1/q)
ln(1/q˜)
+K() if ρ = q,
1
ρ ln(1/ρ)
(
C + α
2ν2q
ρ−q
)
−1 +K() if q < ρ < 1.
(9)
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Proof. We first consider the case ρ 6= q. From Theorem 1(i) it follows that for any k ≥ K1() ,
ln(C(ρ,q)/)
ln(1/max{ρ,q}) , E[‖xk − x∗‖2] ≤ . Then by C(ρ, q) = C + α
2ν2
max{ρ/q,q/ρ}−1 , we obtain the bound on the
iteration complexity defined in Eqn. (8) for cases ρ < q < 1 and q < ρ < 1. For any λ > 1 and positive
integer K, we have that
K∑
k=0
λk ≤
∫ K+1
0
λxdx ≤ λ
K+1
ln(λ)
. (10)
Therefore, we achieve the following bound on the number of samples utilized:
K1()−1∑
k=0
Sk ≤
K1()−1∑
k=0
ρ−(k+1) +K1() ≤ 1
ρ ln(1/ρ)
ρ−K1() +K1().
Note that for any 0 < , p < 1, c1 > 0, the following holds:
ρ
− ln(c1/)
ln(1/p) =
(
eln(ρ
−1)
) ln(c1/)
ln(1/p)
= eln(c1/))
ln(1/ρ)
ln(1/p)
= (c1/)
ln(1/ρ)
ln(1/p) . (11)
Thus, the number of sampled gradients required to obtain an −NE is bounded by 1ρ ln(1/ρ)
(
C(ρ,q)

) ln(1/ρ)
ln(1/max{ρ,q})
+
K1(). Thus, we achieve the bound given in equation (9) for cases ρ < q < 1 and q < ρ < 1.
We now prove the results for the case ρ = q. From Theorem 1(ii) it follows that for any q˜ ∈ (q, 1)
and k ≥ K2() , ln
(
D˜/
)
ln(1/q˜) , E[‖xk − x∗‖2] ≤ . Then we achieve the bound given in Eqn. (8) for
the case ρ = q. Therefore, we may bound the number of sampled gradients for obtaining an -NE by∑K2()−1
k=0 Sk ≤ q
−K2()
q ln(1/q) +K2() =
1
q ln(1/q)
(
D˜/
) ln(1/q)
ln(1/q˜)
+K2(). This is the bound given in (9) for the case
ρ = q. 2
The above theorem establishes that the iteration and oracle complexity to achieve an −NE are
O(ln(1/)) and O((1/)1+δ), where δ = 0 when ρ ∈ (q, 1), δ = ln(q/ρ)ln(1/q) when ρ < q < 1, and δ = ln(q˜/q)ln(1/q˜)
when ρ = q. In the following, we further examine the influence of the condition number on the iteration
and oracle complexity.
Corollary 1 Let the scheme (VS-PGR) be applied to P, where E[‖x0−x∗‖2] ≤ C. Suppose Assumptions
1 and 2 hold. Define the condition number κ , Lη . Set α =
η
L2
and Sk =
⌈
ρ−(k+1)
⌉
with ρ = 1 − 1
2κ2
.
Then iteration and oracle complexity to obtain an −NE are bounded by O(κ2 ln(1/)) and by O (κ2/),
respectively.
Proof.By α = η
L2
and κ = Lη , we obtain that q = 1− 2ηα+α2L2 = 1− η
2
L2
= 1− 1
κ2
. Note that ρ > q by
ρ = 1− 1
2κ2
. Then α
2q
ρ−q ≤ 2
( η
L2
)2
κ2 = 2/L2. Since 1/ρ = 1 + 1
2κ2−1 , ln (1/ρ) ≥ 12κ2−1/(1 + 12κ2−1) = 12κ2
by ln(1 + x) ≥ x/(x + 1) for any x ≥ 0. Thus, by Eqns. (8) and (9) for the case q < ρ < 1, the results
hold by the following:
K() =
ln
(
C + α2ν2q/(ρ− q))+ ln(1/)
ln (1/ρ)
≤ 2 (ln (C + 2ν2/L2)+ ln(1/))κ2 = O(κ2) ln(1/),
M() =
C + α2ν2q/(ρ− q)
ρ ln(1/ρ)
−1 +K() ≤ C + 2ν
2/L2

2κ2
(
1 + 1/(2κ2 − 1))+K() = O(κ2)(1/). 2
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2.1.2 Polynomially Increasing Sample-Size
We now investigate the convergence properties of the scheme (VS-PGR) with polynomially increasing
sample size. We first prove a preliminary result.
Lemma 4 Consider the function d(x) = qx
u
xv where q ∈ (0, 1), x > 0, u ∈ (0, 1], and v > 0. Then d(x)
is unimodal on R+ with a unique maximizer given by x∗ = vln(1/q) . Furthermore, q
x ≤ cq,vx−v for all
x ∈ R+ where cq,v , e−v/u
(
v
u ln(1/q)
)v/u
.
Proof. We begin by noting that d′(x) = ln(q)uqxuxu−1xv + vqxuxv−1 = qxuxv−1(v − u ln(1/q)xu) and
d′(x∗) = 0 if x∗ =
(
v
u ln(1/q)
)1/u
. Unimodality follows by noting that d(0) = 0, d′(x) > 0 if x ∈ (0, x∗),
and d′(x) < 0 when x > x∗. It follows that
cq,v , max
x≥0
d(x) = q(x
∗)u(x∗)v = q
v/u
ln(1/q)
(
v
u ln(1/q)
)v/u
= e−v/u
(
v
u ln(1/q)
)v/u
. 2
Proposition 1 Let (VS-PGR) be applied to P, where Sk , d(k+1)ve for some v > 0 and E[‖x0−x∗‖2] ≤
C. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Let α ∈ (0, 2η/L2) and q , 1− 2αη + α2L2. Then the following
holds:
E[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2] ≤ qk+1
(
C + α2ν2
e2vq−1 − 1
1− q
)
+
2α2ν2q−1
ln(1/q)
(k + 1)−v, ∀k ≥ 0. (12)
In addition, the iteration and oracle complexity to obtain an −NE are O(v(1/)1/v) and O (evvv(1/)1+1/v),
respectively.
Proof. By taking unconditional expectations on both sides of Eqn. (5), using Sk = d(k+ 1)ve we obtain
that E[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2] ≤ qE[‖xk − x∗‖2] + α2ν2(k + 1)−v. Hence
E[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2] ≤ qk+1E[‖x0 − x∗‖2] + α2ν2
k+1∑
m=1
qk+1−mm−v. (13)
Since q ∈ (0, 1) and v > 0, by q−mm−v ≤ ∫m+1m q−t(t− 1)−vdt ∀m ≥ 2, we have
k+1∑
m=1
qk+1−mm−v = qk+1
d2v/ ln(1/q)e∑
m=1
q−mm−v + qk+1
k+1∑
m=d2v/ ln(1/q)e+1
q−mm−v
≤ qk+1
d2v/ ln(1/q)e∑
m=1
q−m + qk+1
∫ k+2
d2v/ ln(1/q)e+1
(q−1)t
(t− 1)v dt
≤ qk (1/q)
d2v/ ln(1/q)e − 1
q−1 − 1 + q
k
∫ k+1
d2v/ ln(1/q)e
(q−1)t
tv
dt.
(14)
Integrating by parts, we obtain that∫ b
a
(q−1)t
tv
dt =
∫ b
a
1
tv
(
(q−1)t
ln(q−1)
)′
dt =
(q−1)t
tv ln(q−1)
∣∣∣b
a
+
∫ b
a
v
t ln(q−1)
(q−1)t
tv
. (15)
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Note that vt ln(1/q) ≤ 12 when t ≥ d2v/ ln(1/q)e. Therefore, by setting a = d2v/ ln(1/q)e, b = k + 1 in the
above equation, the following holds:∫ k+1
d2v/ ln(1/q)e
(q−1)t
tv
dt ≤ (q
−1)t
tv ln(q−1)
∣∣∣k+1
d2v/ ln(1/q)e
+
1
2
∫ k+1
d2v/ ln(1/q)e
(q−1)t
tv
⇒
∫ k+1
d2v/ ln(1/q)e
(q−1)t
tv
dt ≤ 2(q
−1)t
tv ln(q−1)
∣∣∣k+1
d2v/ ln(1/q)e
≤ 2q
−(k+1)(k + 1)−v
ln(1/q)
.
(16)
Note that (1/q)2v/ ln(1/q) =
(
eln(1/q)
)2v/ ln(1/q)
= e2v and hence (1/q)d2v/ ln(1/q)e ≤ e2v/q. Then by substi-
tuting (16) into (14), we have that
k+1∑
m=1
qk+1−mm−v ≤ qk+1 e
2vq−1 − 1
1− q +
2q−1(k + 1)−v
ln(1/q)
. (17)
This incorporated with (13) and E[‖x0 − x∗‖2] ≤ C produces (12).
Since q ∈ (0, 1) and v > 0, by Lemma 4 with u = 1, qk ≤ cq,vk−v with cq,v , e−v
(
v
ln(1/q)
)v
. Then by
(12), we conclude that for any k ≥ 1,
E[‖xk − x∗‖2] ≤
(
Ccq,v + α
2ν2cq,v
e2vq−1 − 1
1− q +
2α2ν2q−1
ln(1/q)
)
k−v , Cvk−v.
Then for any k ≥ K() , (Cv )1/v, E[‖xk − x∗‖2] ≤ . By noting that Cv = O(evvv), the iteration
complexity is O(v(1/)1/v). Therefore, the number of sampled gradients required to obtain an −NE is
bounded by
K()−1∑
k=0
(k + 1)v = (K())v +
K()−1∑
k=1
kv ≤ (K())v +
∫ K()
1
tvdt
=
Cv

+
tv+1
v + 1
∣∣∣K()
1
=
Cv

+ (v + 1)−1
(
Cv

)1+ 1
v
.
Therefore, the oracle complexity is O
(
evvv (1/)1+
1
v
)
. 2
Remark 1 It is worth emphasizing that Prop. 1 implies that as v is increased, the constant in both the
rate and oracle complexity grows at an exponential rate. Choosing an appropriate v requires assessing
both available computational resources and the impact of generating either sample-average gradients or
solving sample-average problems with large sample-sizes and remains a focus of ongoing research.
2.2 Distributed VS-PGR for Aggregative Games
Next, we consider a structured nonsmooth stochastic aggregative game Pagg, where player i ∈ N solves
the following parametrized problem:
min
xi∈Rd
F aggi (xi, x−i) , fi(xi, x¯) + ri(xi), (Paggi (x−i))
where x¯ ,
∑n
i=1 xi denotes the aggregate of all players’ strategies and fi(xi, x¯) , E [ψi(xi, xi + x¯−i; ξ)]
is expectation-valued with x¯−i ,
∑n
j=1,j 6=i xj and the random variable ξ : Ω → Rm. We impose the
following assumptions on the stochastic aggregative game Pagg.
Assumption 3 (i) Assumption 5 (i); (ii) For any y ∈ Rd, fi(xi, y) is C1 and convex in xi ∈ Ri;
(iii) For all y ∈ Rd and any ξ ∈ Rm, ψi(xi, y; ξ) is differentiable in xi ∈ Ri such that ∇xi fi(xi, y) =
E[∇xi ψi(xi, y; ξ)].
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2.2.1 Algorithm Design
In this section, we design a distributed algorithm to compute an NE of Pagg, where each player may
exchange information with its local neighbors, and subsequently update its estimate of the aggregate and
the equilibrium strategy. The interaction among players is defined by an undirected graph G = (N , E),
where N , {1, . . . , n} is the set of players and E is the set of undirected edges between players. The set
of neighbors of player i, denoted by Ni, is defined as Ni = {j ∈ N : (i, j) ∈ E}, and player i is assumed
to be a neighbor of itself. Define the adjacency matrix A = [aij ]
n
i,j=1, where aij > 0 if j ∈ Ni and aij = 0,
otherwise. A path in G with length p from i1 to ip+1 is a sequence of distinct nodes, i1i2 . . . ip+1, such
that (im, im+1) ∈ E , for all m = 1, . . . , p. The graph G is termed connected if there is a path between any
two distinct players i, j ∈ N . Though each player does not have access to all players’ strategies, it may
estimate the aggregate x¯ by communicating with its neighbors. Player i at time k holds an estimate xi,k
for its equilibrium strategy and an estimate vi,k for the average of the aggregate. To overcome the fact
that the communication network is sparse, we assume that to compute vi,k+1, players communicate τk
rounds rather than once at major iteration k + 1. The strategy of each player is updated by a variable
sample-size proximal stochastic gradient scheme characterized by (18) dependent on the constant step
size α > 0 and Sk, the number of sampled gradient are used at time k. We specify the scheme in Algorithm
1.
Algorithm 1 Distrib. VS-PGR for Agg. Stoch. Nash Games
Initialize: Set k = 0, and vi,0 = xi,0 ∈ Ri for any i ∈ N . Let α > 0 and {τk, Sk} be deterministic
sequences.
Iterate until k ≥ K.
Consensus. vˆi,k := vi,k ∀i ∈ N and repeat τk times, vˆi,k :=
∑
j∈Ni aij vˆj,k ∀i ∈ N .
Strategy Update. for every i ∈ N xi,k+1 := proxαri
xi,k − α
Sk
Sk∑
p=1
∇xiψi
(
xi,k, nvˆi,k; ξ
p
k
) ,
(18)
vi,k+1 := vi,k + xi,k+1 − xi,k. (19)
If ei,k , 1Sk
∑Sk
p=1
(∇xiψi(xi,k, nvˆi,k; ξpk)−∇xifi(xi,k, nvˆi,k)) , then (18) can be rewritten as:
xi,k+1 = proxαri [xi,k − α (∇xifi(xi,k, nvˆi,k) + ei,k)] . (20)
We impose the following conditions on the communication graph, gradient mapping, and observation
noises.
Assumption 4 (i) The undirected graph G is connected and the adjacency matrix A is symmetric
with row sums equal to one. (ii) φ(x) , (∇xifi(xi,
∑n
i=1 xi))
n
i=1 is ηφ−strongly monotone, i.e., (φ(x) −
φ(y))T (x− y) ≥ ηφ‖x− y‖2 ∀x, y ∈ R.
(iii) The mapping φ(x) is Lφ-Lipschitz continuous over R, i.e., ‖φ(x)− φ(y)‖ ≤ Lφ‖x− y‖ ∀x, y ∈ R.
(iv) For any i ∈ N and every fixed xi ∈ Ri, ∇xifi(xi, y) is Li-Lipschitz continuous in y, namely,
‖∇xifi(xi, y1)−∇xifi(xi, y2)‖ ≤ Li‖y1 − y2‖ ∀y1, y2 ∈ Rd.
(v) For any i ∈ N , there exists a constant νi > 0 such that for any k ≥ 0, E[ei,k|Fk] = 0 and E[‖ei,k‖2|Fk] ≤
ν2i /Sk, a.s..
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2.2.2 Preliminary Results
Define A(k) , Aτk . Then by Assumption 4(i), A(k) is symmetric with the sum of each row equaling one.
We now recall some results from relevant prior research.
Lemma 5 (i) [33, Proposition 1] Suppose Assumption 4(i) holds. Then there exists a constant θ > 0
and β ∈ (0, 1) such that for any i, j ∈ N ,
∣∣∣[Ak]ij − 1n ∣∣∣ ≤ θβk, ∀k ≥ 1.
(ii) [22, Lemma 2] If yk ,
∑n
i=1 vi,k/n, then yk =
∑n
i=1 xi,k/n.
We now introduce the transition matrices Φ(k, s) from time instance s to k ≥ s, defined as Φ(k, k) =
A(k), Φ(k, s) = A(k)A(k − 1) · · ·A(s) ∀0 ≤ s < k. We may then establish an upper bound on the
consensus error.
Lemma 6 Suppose Assumption 4(i) holds. Let Algorithm 1 be applied to Pagg. Then
‖yk − vˆi,k‖ ≤ θDRβ
∑k
p=0 τp + 2θDR
k∑
s=1
β
∑k
p=s τp ∀k ≥ 0, (21)
where DR ,
∑n
j=1 max
xj∈Rj
‖xj‖, and the constants θ and β are defined in Lemma 5(i).
Proof. By the consensus step in Algorithm 1, we note that vˆi,k =
∑n
j=1[A(k)]ijvj,k. Then by [22, (16)
in Lemma 4], we obtain the following bound on ‖yk − vˆi,k‖:
‖yk − vˆi,k‖ ≤
n∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣ 1n − [Φ(k, 0)]ij
∣∣∣∣ ‖vj,0‖+ k∑
s=1
n∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣ 1n − [Φ(k, s)]ij
∣∣∣∣ ‖xj,s − xj,s−1‖. (22)
By definition of Φ(k, s) and A(k), we have that Φ(k, s) = A
∑k
p=s τp . Then by Lemma 5(i) it follows that
for any i, j ∈ N , ∣∣ 1n − [Φ(k, s)]ij∣∣ ≤ θβ∑kp=s τp , ∀k ≥ s. Then by substituting this bound into (22) we
obtain that
‖yk − vˆi,k‖ ≤ θβ
∑k
p=0 τp
n∑
j=1
‖vj,0‖+ θ
k∑
s=1
β
∑k
p=s τp
n∑
j=1
(||xj,s‖+ ‖xj,s−1||),
and hence by defining DR ,
∑n
j=1 max
xj∈Rj
‖xj‖, we obtain (21). 2
Prior to the main results, we provide a supporting lemma.
Lemma 7 Let β ∈ (0, 1). Define τk , d(k + 1)ue for some u ∈ (0, 1]. Then the following holds for any
k ≥ 1 :
k∑
s=1
β
∑k
p=s τp ≤ e( ln(β−1/(u+1))) −1u+1β (k+1)u+1u+1 + β (k+1)u+1−ku+1u+1 (1 + u+ 1
ku ln(1/β)
)
. (23)
Proof. Since τk = d(k + 1)ue and u > 0, we obtain that
k∑
p=s
τp ≥
k+1∑
p=s+1
pu ≥
∫ k+1
s
tudt =
tu+1
u+ 1
∣∣∣k+1
s
=
(k + 1)u+1 − su+1
u+ 1
. (24)
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Then by β ∈ (0, 1), the following holds with b , β−1/(u+1) :
k∑
s=1
β
∑k
p=s τp ≤ β (k+1)
u+1
u+1
k∑
s=1
bs
u+1
= β
(k+1)u+1
u+1
(
bk
u+1
+
k−1∑
s=1
bs
u+1
)
. (25)
By defining t as t = su+1, implying that s = t1/(u+1) and ds = 1u+1 t
−u/(u+1)dt. Then from b > 1 it follows
that
k−1∑
s=p
bs
u+1 ≤
∫ k
p
bs
u+1
ds =
1
u+ 1
∫ ku+1
pu+1
bt
tu/(u+1)
dt. (26)
Using (15) with v = u/(u+ 1) and q = b−1, we obtain that∫
bt
tu/(u+1)
dt =
bt
tu/(u+1) ln(b)
+
u
(u+ 1)
∫
1
t ln(b)
btdt
tu/(u+1)
.
Define k0 ,
⌊
ln(b)−1/(u+1)
⌋
. Then (k0 + 1)
u+1 ≥ 1ln(b) and 1t ln(b) ≤ 1 if t ≥ (k0 + 1)u+1. Thus,∫ ku+1
(k0+1)u+1
bt
tu/(u+1)
dt ≤ b
t
tu/(u+1) ln(b)
∣∣∣ku+1
(k0+1)u+1
+
u
u+ 1
∫ ku+1
(k0+1)u+1
bt
tu/(u+1)
dt
⇒ 1
u+ 1
∫ ku+1
(k0+1)u+1
bt
tu/(u+1)
dt ≤ b
t
tu/(u+1) ln(b)
∣∣∣ku+1
(k0+1)u+1
<
bk
u+1
ku ln(b)
.
This together with (25), (26), and b = β−1/(u+1) > 1 implies that
k∑
s=1
β
∑k
p=s τp ≤ β (k+1)
u+1
u+1
k0∑
s=1
bs
u+1
+ β
(k+1)u+1
u+1
 k−1∑
k0+1
bs
u+1
+ bk
u+1

≤ β k
u+1
u+1 k0b
ku+10 + β
ku+1
u+1 bk
u+1
(
1 +
1
ku ln(b)
)
.
Then by the fact that bk
u+1
0 ≤ b1/ ln(b) = e since and ku+10 ≤ 1/ ln(b), using b = β−1/(u+1) we obtain (23).
2
2.2.3 Convergence Analysis
Proposition 2 Suppose Assumptions 3 and 4 hold. Let Algorithm 1 be applied to Pagg, where τk , k+1
and Sk ,
⌈
ρ−(k+1)
⌉
for some ρ ∈ (0, 1).Suppose γ , max{ρ, β}, %φ , 1− 2αηφ + 2α2L2φ, C1 , θDR and
C2 , 2θDR
(
e
√
1/ ln(β−1/2) + 2+ln(1/β)
β1/2 ln(1/β)
)
with DR ,
∑n
j=1 max
xj∈Rj
‖xj‖, where the constants θ and β are
given in Lemma 5(i). Then the following holds for any k ≥ 0:
E[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2] ≤ %φE[‖xk − x∗‖2] + C3γk+1, (27)
where C3 , α2
n∑
i=1
ν2i + 4αnDR (C1 + C2)
n∑
i=1
Li + 4α
2n2β
(
C21 + C
2
2
) n∑
i=1
L2i . (28)
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Proof. Similar to Lemma 1, x∗ ∈ X is an NE if and only if x∗ is a fixed point of proxαr(x−αφ(x)) ∀α > 0.
Then by using (20) and the non-expansive property of the proximal operator, we have that
‖xi,k+1 − x∗i ‖2 ≤ ‖xi,k − x∗i − α
(∇xifi(xi,k, nvˆi,k)−∇xifi(x∗i , x¯∗))− αei,k‖2
≤ ‖xi,k − x∗i ‖2 + α2
∥∥∇xifi(xi,k, nvˆi,k)−∇xifi(x∗i , x¯∗)∥∥2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term 1
− 2α (xi,k − x∗i )T
(∇xifi(xi,k, nvˆi,k)−∇xifi(x∗i , x¯∗))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term 2
(29)
− 2α (xi,k − x∗i − α(∇xifi(xi,k, nvˆi,k)−∇xifi(x∗i , x¯∗)))T ei,k + α2‖ei,k‖2.
We now estimate Term 1 and Term 2 of Eqn. (29). Using the triangle inequality, (a+ b)2 ≤ 2(a2 + b2),
and Assumption 4(iv), Term 1 may be bounded as follows:
Term 1 ≤ 2∥∥∇xifi(xi,k, nvˆi,k)−∇xifi(xi,k, nyk)‖2 + 2‖∇xifi(xi,k, nyk)−∇xifi(x∗i , x¯∗)∥∥2
≤ 2n2L2i ‖vˆi,k − yk‖2 + 2‖∇xifi(xi,k, nyk)−∇xifi(x∗i , x¯∗)
∥∥2. (30)
By definition DR ,
∑n
j=1 max
xj∈Rj
‖xj‖ and Ass. 4(iv), the following holds:
(xi,k − x∗i )T (∇xifi(xi,k, nvˆi,k)−∇xifi(xi,k, nyk)) ≥ −‖xi,k − x∗i ‖‖∇xifi(xi,k, nvˆi,k)−∇xifi(xi,k, nyk)‖
≥ −nLi‖xi,k − x∗i ‖‖vˆi,k − yk‖ ≥ −2nLiDR‖vˆi,k − yk‖.
Thus, Term 2 is lower bounded by the following:
Term 2 = (xi,k − x∗i )T (∇xifi(xi,k, vˆi,k)−∇xifi(xi,k, nyk)) + (xi,k − x∗i )T (∇xifi(xi,k, nyk)−∇xifi(x∗i , x¯∗))
≥ −2nLiDR‖vˆi,k − yk‖+ (xi,k − x∗i )T (∇xifi(xi,k, nyk)−∇xifi(x∗i , x¯∗)). (31)
Since {τk} is a deterministic sequence, vˆi,k is adapted to Fk by Algorithm 1. Then by taking expectations
conditioned on Fk of the inequality (29), by substituting (30) and (31), and using Assumption 4(v), we
obtain that
E[‖xi,k+1 − x∗i ‖2|Fk] ≤ ‖xi,k − x∗i ‖2 + 2α2‖∇xifi(xi,k, nyk)−∇xifi(x∗i , x¯∗)
∥∥2 + α2ν2i
Sk
+ 4αnLiDR‖vˆi,k − yk‖ − 2α(xi,k − x∗i )T (∇xifi(xi,k, nyk)−∇xifi(x∗i , x¯∗)) + 2α2n2L2i ‖vˆi,k − yk‖2.
Summing the above inequality over i = 1, · · · , n produces
E[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2|Fk] ≤ ‖xk − x∗‖2 + 2α2
n∑
i=1
‖∇xifi(xi,k, nyk)−∇xifi(x∗i , x¯∗)
∥∥2
+ 4αnDR
n∑
i=1
Li‖vˆi,k − yk‖+ 2α2n2
n∑
i=1
L2i ‖vˆi,k − yk‖2 (32)
− 2α
n∑
i=1
(xi,k − x∗i )T (∇xifi(xi,k, nyk)−∇xifi(x∗i , x¯∗)) + α2
∑n
i=1 ν
2
i
Sk
.
Then using nyk =
∑n
i=1 xi,k (see Lemma 5(ii)) and the definition of φ(x), (32) can be rewritten as:
E[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2|Fk] ≤ ‖xk − x∗‖2 + 2α2‖φ(xk)− φ(x∗)
∥∥2 + α2 n∑
i=1
ν2i /Sk
− 2α(xk − x∗)T (φ(xk)− φ(x∗)) + 4αnDR
n∑
i=1
Li‖vˆi,k − yk‖+ 2α2n2
n∑
i=1
L2i ‖vˆi,k − yk‖2.
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Then using Assumptions 4(ii) and 4(iii), we obtain that
E[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2|Fk] ≤
(
1− 2αηφ + 2α2L2φ
) ‖xk − x∗‖2 + 4αnDR n∑
i=1
Li‖vˆi,k − yk‖
+ 2α2n2
n∑
i=1
L2i ‖vˆi,k − yk‖2 + α2
n∑
i=1
ν2i /Sk. (33)
We now estimate the bound for ‖vˆi,k − yk‖ based on Lemmas 6–7. By using (21) and (23) with u = 1,
from β ∈ (0, 1) and ∑kp=0 τp = (k + 1)(k + 2)/2 it follows that
‖yk − vˆi,k‖ ≤ 2θDR
(
e
√
1/ ln(β−1/2)β
(k+1)2
2 + β
2k+1
2
( 2
k ln(1/β)
+ 1
))
+ θDRβ(k+1)(k+2)/2
≤ 2θDR
(
e
√
1/ ln(β−1/2) +
2 + ln(1/β)
β1/2 ln(1/β)
)
βk+1 + θDRβ(k+1)(k+2)/2 = C1β(k+1)(k+2)/2 + C2βk+1, ∀k ≥ 1.
By (21) it is seen that the above inequality also holds for k = 0, and hence
‖yk − vˆi,k‖ ≤ C1β(k+1)(k+2)/2 + C2βk+1 ∀k ≥ 0. (34)
Then by using (a+b)2 ≤ 2(a2+b2), Sk ≥ ρ−(k+1), %φ = 1−2αηφ+2α2L2φ, and by taking the unconditional
expectations on both sides of (33), we obtain that
E[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2] ≤ %φE[‖xk − x∗‖2] + 4αnDR
(
C1β
(k+1)(k+2)/2 + C2β
k+1
) n∑
i=1
Li
+ 4α2n2
(
C21β
(k+1)(k+2) + C22β
2(k+1)
) n∑
i=1
L2i + α
2ρk+1
n∑
i=1
ν2i ∀k ≥ 0. (35)
This implies (27) by the definition of C3 in (28) and β ∈ (0, 1). 2
Based on the recursion (27) in Prop. 2 and by using Lemma 3, we may obtain the linear convergence
of Alg. 1 with geometrically increasing sample-sizes and communication rounds increasing at a linear rate
given by τk = k + 1.
Theorem 3 (Linear rate of convergence) Suppose Assumptions 3 and 4 hold. Let Algorithm 1 be
applied to Pagg, where τk , k + 1, Sk ,
⌈
ρ−(k+1)
⌉
for some ρ ∈ (0, 1), and E[‖x0 − x∗‖2] ≤ C. Suppose
α ∈
(
0, ηφ/L
2
φ
)
, define %φ , 1 − 2αηφ + 2α2L2φ and γ , max{ρ, β}. Then %φ ∈ (0, 1) and the following
hold for any k ≥ 0:
(i) If γ 6= %φ, then E[‖xk − x∗‖2] ≤
(
C + C3max{%φ/γ,γ/%φ}−1
)
max{%φ, γ}k.
(ii) If γ = %φ, then for any %˜φ ∈ (%φ, 1), E[‖xk − x∗‖2] ≤
(
C + C3ln((%˜φ/%φ)e)
)
%˜kφ.
Similarly to Theorem 2, we may derive bounds on the iteration and oracle complexity as well as the
communication complexity to compute an -NE.
Theorem 4 Suppose Assumptions 3 and 4 hold. Let Alg. 1 be applied to Pagg, where τk = k + 1,
Sk =
⌈
ρ−(k+1)
⌉
for some ρ ∈ (0, 1), and E[‖x0 − x∗‖2] ≤ C. Let %φ , 1− 2αηφ + 2α2L2φ, γ , max{ρ, β},
α ∈
(
0, ηφ/L
2
φ
)
, %˜φ ∈ (%φ, 1), and C3 be defined by (28). Then the iteration, communication, and oracle
complexity to obtain an −NE are respectively bounded by K(), K()(K()+1)2 , and M(), where K() and
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M() are defined as follows.
K() ,

1
ln(1/%φ)
ln
((
C + C3%φ/γ−1
)
−1
)
if γ < %φ < 1,
1
ln(1/%˜φ)
ln
((
C + C3ln((%˜φ/%φ)e)
)
−1
)
if γ = %φ,
1
ln(1/γ) ln
((
C + C3γ/%φ−1
)
−1
)
if %φ < γ < 1,
(36)
M() ,

1
ρ ln(1/ρ)
((
C + C3%φ/γ−1
)
−1
) ln(1/ρ)
ln(1/%φ) +K() if γ < %φ < 1,
1
ρ ln(1/ρ)
((
C + C3ln((%˜φ/%φ)e)
)
−1
) ln(1/ρ)
ln(1/%˜φ) +K() if γ = %φ,
1
ρ ln(1/ρ)
(
C + C3γ/%φ−1
)
−1 +K() if %φ < γ < 1.
(37)
Proof. Based on the geometric rate of convergence established in Theorem 3, we can establish the
iteration complexity (K() defined in (36)) and oracle complexity (M() defined in (37)) in the same
way as of Theorem 2. Since τk = k + 1, the communication complexity (no. of communication rounds)
required to obtain an -NE is bounded by
∑K()−1
k=0 τk =
∑K()
k=1 k =
K()(K()+1)
2 . Thus, the theorem is
proved. 2
We now prove that the optimal oracle complexity O (1/) is obtainable under suitable algorithm
parameters.
Corollary 2 Let Algorithm 1 be applied to Pagg, where E[‖x0 − x∗‖2] ≤ C and τk = k + 1. Suppose
Assumptions 3 and 4 hold. Set α =
ηφ
2L2φ
and Sk =
⌈
ρ−(k+1)
⌉
with ρ , max
{
1− η
2
φ
2L2φ
, β
}
. Then the
iteration, communication, and oracle complexity to obtain an −NE are O(ln(1/)), O(ln2(1/)), and
O (1/), respectively.
Proof. By α =
ηφ
2L2φ
, we obtain that %φ = 1−2αηφ+2α2L2φ = 1−
η2φ
2L2φ
. Note that γ = max{ρ, β} = ρ > %φ
by the fact that ρ ≥ 1 − η
2
φ
aL2φ
> 1 − η
2
φ
2L2φ
. Thus, by using (36) and (37) for the case γ > %φ, γ = ρ, we
obtain that K() = 1ln(1/ρ) ln
(
−1
ρ ln(1/ρ)
(
C + C3ρ/%φ−1
))
and M() =
C+
C3
ρ/%φ−1
ρ ln(1/ρ) 
−1 +K(). 2
Remark 2 Our work is not the first to utilize increasing communication rounds. Recall that in [15], a
distributed accelerated gradient algorithm is employed to solve a distributed convex optimization problem,
where at each step, O(ln(k)) consensus steps are taken. The authors show that in convex settings, the rate
is O(1/k2) (optimal) while the total number of communications rounds is O(k ln(k)) up to time k. The
recent paper [14] considers the multi-agent constrained optimization of a strongly convex function and the
authors design a distributed primal-dual algorithm requiring O(ln(k)) communication rounds at iteration
k. The proposed method [14] has a non-asymptotic convergence rate O(1/k2) and requires O(k ln(k)) local
communications for all k iterations. Our scheme (Alg. 1) requires k+1 communication rounds at iteration
k and a total O(k2) up to time instance k to recover the optimal geometric convergence rate but does so in
a stochastic game-theoretic regime. To the best of our knowledge, the optimal communication complexity
for aggregative game in deterministic regimes is still an open question and this paper is amongst the first
one to establish the communication complexity in stochastic Nash games via stochastic gradient-based
techniques.
In the following, we will explore the performance of Algorithm 1 with polynomially increasing sample
sizes and communication rounds.
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Corollary 3 Suppose Assumptions 3–4 hold. Let Alg. 1 be applied to Pagg, where E[‖x0 − x∗‖2] ≤ C,
τk , d(k + 1)ue and Sk , d(k + 1)ve for some u ∈ (0, 1) and v > 0. Let α ∈
(
0, ηφ/L
2
φ
)
and %φ ,
1− 2αηφ + 2α2L2φ. Then for all k ≥ 1, E[‖xk − x∗‖2] = O (k−v), and the iteration, communication, and
oracle complexity to obtain an −NE are O((1/)1/v), O((1/)(u+1)/v), and O ((1/)1+1/v), respectively.
Proof. We first estimate the bound for ‖vˆi,k − yk‖ based on Lemmas 6 and 7. Since tu+1, u > 0 is
convex in x > 0, we have (k + 1)u+1 − ku+1 ≥ ∇xu+1∣∣
x=k
= (u + 1)ku. Thus, (k+1)
u+1
u+1 ≥ k
u+1
u+1 + k
u and
(k+1)u+1−ku+1
u+1 ≥ ku. Then by using (21), (23), and (24), from β ∈ (0, 1) it follows that for any k ≥ 1 :
‖yk − vˆi,k‖ ≤ θDR
(
1 + 2e
(
ln(β−1/(u+1))
) −1
u+1
)
β
ku+1
u+1
+ku + 2θDRβk
u(
1 +
u+ 1
ku ln(1/β)
)
≤ C˜ββkuwhere C˜β , θDRβ
1
u+1
(
1 + 2e
(
ln(β−1/(u+1))
) −1
u+1 )
+ 2θDR
u+ 1 + ln(1/β)
ln(1/β)
.
By (21), the above inequality also holds for k = 0. Hence ‖yk − vˆi,k‖ ≤ C˜ββku , ∀k ≥ 0. Then using (33),
Sk = d(k + 1)ve, and %φ = 1− 2αηφ + 2α2L2φ, we obtain that
E[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2] ≤ %φE[‖xk − x∗‖2] + α2(k + 1)−v
n∑
i=1
ν2i + 4αnDRC˜ββ
ku
n∑
i=1
Li + 2α
2n2C˜2ββ
2ku
n∑
i=1
L2i
≤ %φE[‖xk − x∗‖2] + C˜oββk
u
+ α2(k + 1)−v
n∑
i=1
ν2i
= %k+1φ E[‖x0 − x∗‖2] +
(
α2
n∑
i=1
ν2i
) k+1∑
m=0
%k+1−mφ m
−v + C˜oβ
k∑
m=0
%k−mφ β
mu , (38)
where C˜oβ , 4αnDRC˜β
∑n
i=1 Li+ 2α
2n2C˜2β
∑n
i=1 L
2
i . We now estimate the uppeer bound of the last term
in the above inequality. Since %φ ∈ (0, 1) and β ∈ 0, 1),
∑k
m=0 %
−m
φ β
mu ≤ ∫ k+10 %−tφ βtudt. Integrating by
parts, ∫
%−tφ β
tudt =
∫
βt
u
(
%−tφ
ln(%−1φ )
)′
dt =
βt
u
%−tφ
ln(%−1φ )
−
∫
%−tφ
ln(%−1φ )
(βt
u
)′dt
=
βt
u
%−tφ
ln(%−1φ )
+ ln(1/β)u
∫
%−tφ
ln(%−1φ )
βt
u
tu−1dt =
βt
u
%−tφ
ln(%−1φ )
+
∫
ln(1/β)u
ln(%−1φ )t1−u
%−tφ β
tudt
Note that ln(1/β)u
ln(%−1φ )t1−u
≤ 12 when t ≥ t0 ,
⌈
(2u ln(1/β)/ ln(1/%φ))
1/(1−u)⌉. Similarly to (16), we obtain∫ k+1
t0
%−tφ β
tudt ≤ 2β
tu%−tφ
ln(%−1φ )
∣∣k+1
t=t0
≤ 2β
(k+1)u%
−(k+1)
φ
ln(%−1φ )
. This incorporated with (38) and (17) implies that
E[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2] = O
(
(k + 1)−v + e2v%k+1φ + β
(k+1)u + %
−(2u ln(1/β)/ ln(1/%φ))1/(1−u)
φ %
k+1
φ
)
.
Thus, by using Lemma 4, we obtain that
E[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2] = O
((
evvv + e−v/u
(
v
u ln(1/q)
)v/u
+ vve−v%−(2u ln(1/β)/ ln(1/%φ))
1/(1−u)
φ
)
(k + 1)−v
)
= O
(
ev
(
v
u
)v/u
%
−(2u ln(1/β)/ ln(1/%φ))1/(1−u)
φ (k + 1)
−v
)
.
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Then the iteration and oracle complexity to obtain an −NE areO
((
v
u
)1/u
%
−(2u ln(1/β)/ ln(1/%φ))1/v(1−u)
φ (1/)
1/v
)
andO
(
ev
(
v
u
)(v+1)/u
%
−(2u ln(1/β)/ ln(1/%φ))(v+1)/v(1−u)
φ (1/)
1+1/v
)
, respectively while the communication com-
plexity
K()−1∑
k=0
τk ≤ (K())u +
∫K()
1 t
udt = (K())u + t
u+1
u+1
∣∣∣K()
1
is bounded by
O
(
eu
(
v
u
)1+1/u
%
−(2u ln(1/β)/ ln(1/%φ))(u+1)/v(1−u)
φ (1/)
(u+1)/v
)
. 2
3 VS-PBR Scheme and the distributed variant
In this section, after providing some background in Section 3.1, we consider a class of stochastic Nash
games in which the proximal BR map is contractive [7]. In Section 3.2, we conduct a rate and complexity
analysis for a variable sample size proximal BR scheme for computing an NE, where in each iteration,
each player solves a sample-average BR problem. Distributed variants of (VS-PBR) are examined in
Section 3.3 where analogous rate and complexity statements are provided.
3.1 Background on proximal best-response maps
For any tuple y ∈ Rd, let the proximal BR map x̂(y) be defined as follows:
x̂(y) , argmin
x∈Rd
[
n∑
i=1
Fi(xi, y−i) +
µ
2
‖x− y‖2
]
for some µ > 0. (39)
It is clear that the objective function is separable in xi and (39) reduces to a set of player-specific proximal
BR problems, where player i solves the following problem:
x̂i(y) , argmin
xi∈Rdi
[
E [ψi(xi, y−i; ξ)] + ri(xi) +
µ
2
‖xi − yi‖2
]
. (40)
We impose the following assumption on problem (Pi(x−i)).
Assumption 5 (i) The function ri is lower semicontinuous and convex with effective domain denoted
by Ri, which is required to be compact. (ii) For every fixed x−i ∈ R−i, fi(xi, x−i) is C1 and convex in
xi ∈ Ri, and ∇xifi(xi, x−i) is Li-Lipschitz continuous in xi, i.e., ‖∇xifi(xi, x−i) − ∇xifi(x′i, x−i)‖ ≤
Li‖xi − x′i‖ ∀xi, x′i ∈ Ri. (iii) For any i ∈ N , all x−i ∈ R−i and any ξ ∈ Rm, ψi(xi, x−i; ξ) is
differentiable in xi such that for some νi > 0, E[‖∇xifi(xi, x−i)−∇xiψi(xi, x−i; ξ)‖2] ≤ ν2i ∀x ∈ R.
Then by [7, Proposition 12.5], x∗ is an NE of the game P if and only if x∗ is a fixed point of the
proximal best-response map x̂(•), that is, if and only if x∗ = x̂(x∗). By Assumption 5, the second
derivatives of the functions fi, ∀i ∈ N on R are bounded. Analogous to the avenue adopted in [7], we
may define
Γ ,

µ
µ+ζ1,min
ζ12,max
µ+ζ1,min
. . .
ζ1n,max
µ+ζ1,min
ζ21,max
µ+ζ2,min
µ
µ+ζ2,min
. . .
ζ2n,max
µ+ζ2,min
...
. . .
ζn1,max
µ+ζn,min
ζn2,max
µ+ζn,min
. . . µµ+ζn,min
 , (41)
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where ζi,min , infx∈R λmin
(∇2xifi(x)) and ζij,max , supx∈R ‖∇2xixjfi(x)‖ ∀j 6= i. Then by [37, Theorem
4], we may obtain the following relation:‖x̂1(y
′)− x̂1(y)‖
...
‖x̂n(y′)− x̂n(y)‖
 ≤ Γ
‖y
′
1 − y1‖
...
‖y′n − yn‖
 . (42)
If the spectral radius ρ(Γ) < 1, then the proximal best-response map is contractive w.r.t. some monotonic
norm. Sufficient conditions for the contractive property of the proximal BR map x̂(•) can be found
in [7, 37].
3.2 Variable sample-size proximal BR schemes
Suppose at iteration k, we have Sk realizations ξ
1
k, · · · , ξSkk of the random vector ξ. For any xi ∈ Ri, we
approximate the payoff fi(xi, y−i,k) by its sample-average 1Sk
∑Sk
p=1 ψi(xi, y−i,k; ξ
p
k) and solve the sample-
average best-response problem (43). We then obtain the variable-size proximal BR scheme (Algorithm 2).
Algorithm 2 Variable-size proximal best-response scheme
Set k := 0. Given K > 0, let yi,0 = xi,0 ∈ Xi for i = 1, . . . , n.
(1) For i = 1, . . . , n, player i updates estimate xi,k+1 as
xi,k+1 = argmin
xi∈Rdi
[
1
Sk
Sk∑
p=1
ψi(xi, y−i,k; ξ
p
k) + ri(xi) +
µ
2
‖xi − yi,k‖2
]
. (43)
(2) For i = 1, . . . , n, yi,k+1 := xi,k+1; (3) Set k := k + 1 and return to (1) if k < K.
Denote by εi,k+1 , xi,k+1 − x̂i(yk) the inexactness associated with the approximate proximal BR
solution. We now give the bound of E
[‖εi,k+1‖2] regarding the inexactness sequence in the following
lemma.
Lemma 8 Suppose Assumption 5 holds. Let Algorithm 2 be applied to P. Let Ci,b , µµ2+L2i
(
1 −
Li/
√
µ2 + L2i
)−1
. Then for any i = 1, · · · , n, E[‖xi,k+1 − x̂i(yk)‖2] ≤ ν
2
i C
2
i,b
Sk
, ∀k ≥ 0.
Proof. Define w¯i,k(xi) , 1Sk
∑Sk
p=1∇xiψi(xi, y−i,k; ξpk) −∇xifi(xi, y−i,k). By the optimality condition of
(43), xi,k+1 is a fixed point of proxαri
[
xi−α
(∇xifi(xi, y−i,k)+µ(xi−yi,k)+w¯i,k(xi))] for any α > 0. By ap-
plying the optimality condition on (40), x̂i(yk) is a fixed point of proxαri [xi − α(∇xifi(xi, y−i,k) + µ(xi − yi,k))]
for any α > 0. Then by the nonexpansive property of the proximal operator, we have the following:
‖xi,k+1 − x̂i(yk)‖ ≤
∥∥∥(1− αµ)(xi,k+1 − x̂i(yk))− α (∇xifi(xi,k+1, y−i,k)−∇xifi(x̂i(yk), y−i,k))∥∥∥
+ α‖w¯i,k(xi,k+1)‖. (44)
Note by Ass. 5(ii) that fi(xi, x−i) is convex in xi ∈ Ri for every fixed x−i ∈ R−i. Then∥∥∥(1− αµ)(xi,k+1 − x̂i(yk))− α (∇xifi(xi,k+1, y−i,k)−∇xifi(x̂i(yk), y−i,k))∥∥∥2
= (1− αµ)2
∥∥∥xi,k+1 − x̂i(yk)∥∥∥2 + α2 ‖∇xifi(xi,k+1, y−i,k)−∇xifi(x̂i(yk), y−i,k)‖2
− 2α(1− αµ) (∇xifi(xi,k+1, y−i,k)−∇xifi(x̂i(yk), y−i,k))T (xi,k+1 − x̂i(yk))
≤ ((1− αµ)2 + α2L2i ) ‖xi,k+1 − x̂i(yk)‖2 ,
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which incorporated with (44) implies that for any α > 0,
‖xi,k+1 − x̂i(yk)‖ ≤
√
(1− αµ)2 + α2L2i ‖xi,k+1 − x̂i(yk)‖+ α‖w¯i,k(xi,k+1)‖.
In the above inequality, by setting α = µ
µ2+L2i
, we obtain that ‖xi,k+1 − x̂i(yk)‖ ≤ Ci,b‖w¯i,k(xi,k+1)‖. By
Ass. 5(iii), there holds E[‖w¯i,k(xi,k+1)‖2] ≤ ν
2
i
Sk
and E[‖xi,k+1 − x̂i(yk)‖2] ≤ C2i,bE[‖w¯i,k(xi,k)‖2] ≤
ν2i C
2
i,b
Sk
.
2
Based on this lemma, we obtain a linear rate of convergence with a suitably selected sample size Sk.
Proposition 3 (Linear rate of convergence) Suppose Assumption 5 holds and a , ‖Γ‖ < 1, where
Γ is defined in (41). Define Cns = maxi ν
2
i C
2
i,b with Ci,b ,
µ
µ2+L2i
(
1 − Li/
√
µ2 + L2i
)−1
. Let Algorithm
2 be applied to P, where E[‖x0 − x∗‖2] ≤ C and Sk =
⌈
Cns
η2(k+1)
⌉
for some η ∈ (0, 1). Then the following
holds for any k ≥ 0.
(i) If a 6= η, then E[‖xk − x∗‖2] ≤
(√
C +
√
n
max{a/η,η/a}−1
)2
max{a, η}2k.
(ii) If η = a, then for any a˜ ∈ (a, 1), E[‖xk − x∗‖2] ≤
(√
C +
√
n/ ln((a˜/a)e)
)2
a˜2k.
Proof. By x∗i = x̂i(x
∗), using the triangle inequality and yk = xk we obtain that:
‖xi,k+1 − x∗i ‖ ≤ ‖xi,k+1 − x̂i(xk)‖+ ‖x̂i(xk)− x̂i(x∗)‖. (45)
Then by the triangle inequality, (42), and a , ‖Γ‖ < 1, we have the following bound:
vk+1 ,
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
‖x1,k+1 − x
∗
1‖
...
‖xn,k+1 − x∗n‖

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ a
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
‖x1,k − x
∗
1‖
...
‖xn,k − x∗n‖

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥+
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
‖x1,k+1 − x̂1(xk)‖...
‖xn,k+1 − x̂n(xk)‖

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥ . (46)
Therefore, the following holds:
v2k+1 ≤ a2v2k + 2avk
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
‖x1,k+1 − x̂1(xk)‖...
‖xn,k+1 − x̂n(xk)‖

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥+
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
‖x1,k+1 − x̂1(xk)‖...
‖xn,k+1 − x̂n(xk)‖

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
. (47)
Since Sk =
⌈maxi ν2i C2i,b
η2(k+1)
⌉ ≥ ν2i C2i,b
η2(k+1)
, by Lemma 8, E[‖xi,k+1− x̂i(yk)‖2] ≤ η2(k+1). Then by taking expecta-
tions of the inequality (47), using the Ho¨lder’s inequality E[‖XY ‖] ≤ (E[‖X‖2]) 12 (E[‖Y ‖2]) 12 , we obtain
that
E[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2] ≤ a2E[‖xk − x∗‖2] + 2a
√
nηk+1
√
E[‖xk − x∗‖2] + nη2(k+1)
=
(
a
√
E[‖xk − x∗‖2] +
√
nηk+1
)2
⇒
√
E[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2] ≤ a
√
E[‖xk − x∗‖2] +
√
nηk+1. (48)
Based on the resursion (48), by using Lemma 3 we obtain the results. 2
Note that xi,k+1 defined by (43) requires solving a deterministic optimization. In the following,
we establish the iteration complexity (no. of deterministic optimization problems solved) and oracle
complexity to obtain an −NE.
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Theorem 5 Suppose Assumption 5 holds, a , ‖Γ‖ < 1, Ci,b , µµ2+L2i
(
1− Li/
√
µ2 + L2i
)−1
, and Cns ,
maxi ν
2
i C
2
i,b. Let Algorithm 2 be applied to P, where E[‖x0 − x∗‖2] ≤ C and Sk =
⌈
Cns
η2(k+1)
⌉
for some
η ∈ (0, 1). Let a˜ ∈ (a, 1), and D = 1/ ln((a˜/a)e). Then the iteration and oracle complexity to obtain an
−NE are bounded by Kb() and Mb() respectively, each of which is defined as follows.
Kb() ,

1
ln(1/a) ln
(√
C+η
√
n/(a−η)√

)
if η < a,
1
ln(1/a˜) ln
(√
C+
√
nD√

)
if η = a,
1
ln(1/η) ln
(√
C+a
√
n/(η−a)√

)
if η > a,
(49)
Mb() ,

Cns
η2 ln(1/η2)
(
(
√
C+η
√
n/(a−η))2

) ln(1/η)
ln(1/a)
+K() if η < a,
Cns
a2 ln(1/a2)
(
(
√
C+
√
nD)2

) ln(1/a)
ln(1/a˜)
+K() if η = a,
Cns
η2 ln(1/η2)
(
(
√
C+a
√
n/(η−a))2

)
+K() if η > a.
(50)
Proof. We first validate the case when η = a. By Proposition 3(ii), we obtain that for any k ≥ Kb0() =
ln((
√
C+
√
nD)/
√
)
ln(1/a˜) , there hold a˜
k ≤
√

(
√
C+
√
nD)
and E[‖xk − x∗‖2] ≤ . Then the bound given by (49) for
η = a holds. By using (10) and (11), we may bound the number of sample-sizes required to obtain an
-NE by
Kb0 ()−1∑
k=0
Sk ≤
Kb0 ()−1∑
k=0
(
Cns
a2(k+1)
+ 1
)
≤ Cns
a2 ln(1/a2)
a−2Kb0 () +Kb0()
=
Cns
a2 ln(1/a2)
(
(
√
C +
√
nD)/
√

) ln(1/a2)
ln(1/a˜)
+Kb0().
This is the bound given in (50) for the case η = a. We now prove the results for η 6= a. From Proposition
3(i) it follows that for any k ≥ Kb1() ,
ln
((√
C+
√
n
max{a/η,η/a}−1
)
/
√

)
ln(1/max{a,η}) , E[‖xk−x∗‖2] ≤ . Then we achieve the
bound given in (49) for η > a and η < a. Similarly, by (10) and (11), we may bound the number of sampled
gradients by
∑Kb1 ()−1
k=0 Sk ≤ Cnsη
−2Kb1 ()
η2 ln(1/η2)
+Kb1() =
Cns
η2 ln(1/η2)
((√
C +
√
n
max{a/η,η/a}−1
)
/
√

) ln(1/η2)
ln(1/max{a,η}) +
Kb1(), giving us the required result. 2
The above theorem establishes that when the number of scenarios increases at a geometric rate, the
iteration and oracle complexity to achieve an −NE are respectively O(ln(1/)) and O((1/)1+δ), where
δ = 0 when η ∈ (a, 1), δ = ln(a/η)ln(1/a) when η < a < 1, and δ = ln(a˜/a)ln(1/a˜) when η = a. Similar to the discussions
in Section 2.1.2, we now establish the rate and complexity properties of Algorithm 2 with polynomially
increasing sample-sizes.
Corollary 4 Let Algorithm 2 be applied to P, where E[‖x0 − x∗‖2] ≤ C and Sk , d(k + 1)ve for some
v > 0. Suppose Assumption 5 holds and a , ‖Γ‖ < 1, where Γ is defined in (41). Then we obtain the
polynomial rate of convergence E[‖xk+1−x∗‖2] = O ((k + 1)−v) and establish that the iteration and oracle
complexity bounds to obtain an −NE are O(v(1/)1/v) and O (evvv(1/)1+1/v), respectively.
Proof. Define Cmc =
√∑n
i=1 ν
2
i C
2
i,b with Ci,b ,
µ
µ2+L2i
(
1 − Li/
√
µ2 + L2i
)−1
. Similar to Eqn. (48), by
using Sk = d(k + 1)ve and Lemma 8, we obtain that√
E[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2] ≤ a
√
E[‖xk − x∗‖2] + Cmc(k + 1)−v/2 ≤ ak+1
√
E[‖x0 − x∗‖2] + Cmc
k+1∑
m=1
ak+1−mm−v/2.
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Then by (17), we have that for any k ≥ 1, √E[‖xk − x∗‖2] ≤ ak (√C + Cmc eva−1−11−a ) + Cmc2a−1ln(1/a) k−v/2.
Since a ∈ (0, 1) and v > 0, by Lemma 4 with u = 1, ak ≤ e−v/2
(
v
ln(1/a)
)v/2
k−v/2 ∀k ≥ 1. Then√
E[‖xk − x∗‖2] = O
(
ev/2vv/2k−v/2
)
and hence E[‖xk − x∗‖2] = O (evvvk−v). Similar to Corollary 2,
we can prove that the oracle and oracle complexity bounds to obtain an −NE are O(v(1/)1/v) and
O (evvv(1/)1+1/v), respectively. 2
3.3 Distributed VS-PBR for Aggregative Games
We propose a distributed VS-PBR scheme (Algorithm 3) to solve the aggregative game Pagg formulated
in Section 2.2, where the gradient-response update (18) in Algorithm 1 is replaced by the inexact BR
update (52).
3.3.1 Algorithm Design
For any yi ∈ Ri and any y¯i ∈ Rd, we define the proximal BR map as follows:
Ti(yi, y¯i) , argmin
xi∈Rd
[
fi(xi, y¯i) + ri(xi) +
µ
2
‖xi − yi‖2
]
µ > 0. (51)
Then Ti(yi, y¯i) is uniquely defined by Ass. 3(i) and 3(ii). Suppose at iteration k, each player updates
its belief of the aggregate by multiple consensus steps, utilizes Sk realizations to approximate the payoff
fi(xi, nvˆi,k) at the estimated aggregate nvˆi,k, then solve the sample-average proximal BR problem (52).
We then obtain Alg. 3.
Algorithm 3 Distrib. VS-PBR for Agg. Stoch. Nash Games
Initialize: Set k = 0, and vi,0 = xi,0 ∈ Ri for any i ∈ N . Let α > 0 and {τk} be a deterministic sequence.
Iterate until k > K
Consensus. vˆi,k := vi,k ∀i ∈ N and repeat τk times: vˆi,k :=
∑
j∈Ni aij vˆj,k ∀i ∈ N .
Strategy Update. for every i ∈ N xi,k+1 = argmin
xi∈Rdi
[
1
Sk
Sk∑
p=1
ψi(xi, nvˆi,k; ξ
p
k) + ri(xi) +
µ
2
‖xi − xi,k‖2
]
,
(52)
vi,k+1 := vi,k + xi,k+1 − xi,k. (53)
3.3.2 Rate Analysis
We impose additional assumptions on the Pagg.
Assumption 6 (i) There exists a constant La > 0 such that for any i ∈ N and y ∈ Rd:
‖∇xifi(xi, y)−∇xifi(x′i, y)‖ ≤ La‖xi − x′i‖ ∀xi, x′i ∈ Ri. (54)
(ii) For any i ∈ N and any y ∈ Rm, ψi(xi, y; ξ) is differentiable in xi ∈ Ri such that for some νi > 0,
E[‖∇xifi(xi, y)−∇xiψi(xi, y; ξ)‖2] ≤ ν2i ∀xi ∈ Ri, y ∈ Rm.
We may claim the Lipschitz continuity of Ti(yi, y¯i) in the following Lemma.
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Lemma 9 Suppose Assumptions 3(i), 3(ii), 4(iv), and 6(i) hold. If Lt , µmaxi∈N Liµ2+L2a
(
1−La/
√
µ2 + L2a
)−1
,
where µ is the parameter used in (51). There for any i ∈ N and any yi ∈ Ri, the following holds:
‖Ti(yi, y¯i)− Ti(yi, y¯)‖ ≤ Lt‖y¯i − y¯‖ ∀y¯i, y¯ ∈ Rd. (55)
Proof. By the optimality condition of (51), Ti(yi, y¯i) is a fixed point of the map proxαri
[
xi−α
(∇xifi(xi, y¯i)+
µ(xi − yi)
)]
for any α > 0. Then by using the triangle inequality and the nonexpansive property of the
proximal operator, we have the following for any y¯i, y¯ ∈ Rd:
‖Ti(yi, y¯i)− Ti(yi, y¯)‖ ≤
∥∥∥ (Ti(yi, y¯i)− α(∇xifi (Ti(yi, y¯i), y¯i) + µ(Ti(yi, y¯i)− yi)))
− (Ti(yi, y¯)− α(∇xifi (Ti(yi, y¯), y¯) + µ(Ti(yi, y¯)− yi))) ∥∥∥
=
∥∥∥(1− αµ) (Ti(yi, y¯i)− Ti(yi, y¯))− α(∇xifi (Ti(yi, y¯i), y¯i)−∇xifi (Ti(yi, y¯), y¯i))
− α
(
∇xifi (Ti(yi, y¯), y¯i)−∇xifi (Ti(yi, y¯), y¯)
)∥∥∥
≤
∥∥∥(1− αµ) (Ti(yi, y¯i)− Ti(yi, y¯))− α(∇xifi (Ti(yi, y¯i), y¯i)−∇xifi (Ti(yi, y¯), y¯i))∥∥∥
+ α
∥∥∥∇xifi (Ti(yi, y¯), y¯i)−∇xifi (Ti(yi, y¯), y¯)∥∥∥. (56)
Using Eqn. (54), the convexity of fi (xi, y¯i) in xi ∈ Ri for any y¯i ∈ Rd by Assumption 3(ii), we obtain
that ∥∥∥(1− αµ) (Ti(yi, y¯i)− Ti(yi, y¯))− α(∇xifi (Ti(yi, y¯i), y¯i)−∇xifi (Ti(yi, y¯), y¯i))∥∥∥2
≤ (1− αµ)2
∥∥∥ (Ti(yi, y¯i)− Ti(yi, y¯)) ‖2 + α2∥∥∥∇xifi (Ti(yi, y¯i), y¯i)−∇xifi (Ti(yi, y¯), y¯i)∥∥∥2
− 2α(1− αµ) (Ti(yi, y¯i)− Ti(yi, y¯))
(
∇xifi (Ti(yi, y¯i), y¯i)−∇xifi (Ti(yi, y¯), y¯i)
)
≤ (1− 2αµ+ α2(µ2 + L2a)) ∥∥∥ (Ti(yi, y¯i)− Ti(yi, y¯))∥∥∥2 ∀α ∈ (0, 1/µ). (57)
By combining (57) and (56) and invoking Ass. 4(iv) produces
‖Ti(yi, y¯i)− Ti(yi, y¯)‖ ≤
(
1− 2αµ+ α2(µ2 + L2a)
) 1
2 ‖Ti(yi, y¯i)− Ti(yi, y¯)‖+ αLi‖y¯i − y¯‖.
Then by setting α = µ
µ2+L2a
, we obtain (55). 2
Similar to Lemma 8, we can obtain the following result.
Lemma 10 Suppose Assumptions 3(i), 3(ii), 4(iv), and 6 hold. Let Algorithm 3 be applied to Pagg.
Define εi,k+1 , xi,k+1−Ti(xi,k, nvˆi,k) and Cr , µµ2+L2a
(
1− La/
√
µ2 + L2a
)−1
. Then for any i = 1, · · · , n,
E[‖εi,k+1‖2] ≤ ν
2
i C
2
r
Sk
.
Proposition 4 Let Assumptions 3, 4(i), 4(iv), and 6 hold. Suppose a = ‖Γ‖ < 1 with Γ defined by
(41), and E
[‖x0 − x∗‖2] ≤ C. Let Algorithm 3 be applied to Pagg, where τk = k + 1, Sk = ⌈C2r maxi ν2iη2(k+1) ⌉
with Cr , µµ2+L2a
(
1− La/
√
µ2 + L2a
)−1
for some η ∈ (0, 1). Define C4 ,
√
n + n
3
2Lt (C1 + C2), and
γ , max{η, β}, where C1 and C2 are defined in Proposition 2, and β and Lt be given in Lemma 5(i) and
Lemma 9, respectively. Then the following holds for any k ≥ 0:
(i) If a 6= γ, then E[‖xk − x∗‖2] ≤ Q2 max{a, γ}2k, where Q ,
√
C + C4max{a/γ,γ/a}−1 .
(ii) If γ = a, then for any a˜ ∈ (a, 1), E[‖xk − x∗‖2] ≤
(
Q˜
)2
a˜2k, where Q˜ ,
√
C + C4/ ln((a˜/a)
e.
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Proof. By noting that x∗i = x̂i(x
∗), using the triangle inequality we obtain that
‖xi,k+1 − x∗i ‖ ≤ ‖xi,k+1 − Ti(xi,k, nvˆi,k)‖+ ‖Ti(xi,k, nvˆi,k)− x̂i(xk)‖+ ‖x̂i(xk)− x̂i(x∗)‖, (58)
where x̂i(•) is defined by (39). By the definition of Ti(·, ·) in (51) and yk =
∑n
i=1 xi,k/n from Lemma
5(ii), we have that for any i ∈ N , x̂i(xk) = Ti (xi,k,
∑n
i=1 xi,k) = Ti(xi,k, nyk), and hence ‖Ti(xi,k, nvˆi,k)−
x̂i(xk)‖ ≤ nLt‖vˆi,k − yk‖ by (55). Then by using (58), there holds ‖xi,k+1 − x∗i ‖ ≤ ‖εi,k+1‖+ nLt‖vˆi,k −
yk‖+ ‖x̂i(xk)− x̂i(x∗)‖. Similarly to (46), we may obtain the following recursion:
vk+1 ≤ avk +
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
‖ε1,k+1‖...
‖εn,k+1‖

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥+ nLt
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
‖vˆ1,k − yk‖...
‖vˆn,k − yk‖

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥ . (59)
From (34) and β ∈ (0, 1) it follows that for any k ≥ 0,∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
‖vˆ1,k − yk‖...
‖vˆn,k − yk‖

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥ ≤
√
n
(
C1β
(k+1)(k+2)/2 + C2β
k+1
)
≤ √n (C1 + C2)βk+1. (60)
Note that E[‖εi,k+1‖2] ≤ η2k ∀i ∈ N by Sk =
⌈
C2r maxi ν
2
i
η2(k+1)
⌉
and Lemma 10. Then using (59) and (60),
similar to the derivation of (48) we obtain that√
E[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2] ≤ a
√
E[‖xk − x∗‖2] +
√
nηk+1 + n
3
2Lt (C1 + C2)β
k+1.
Thus, by the definitions γ = max{η, β} and C4 =
√
n + n
3
2Lt (C1 + C2), we obtain that for any k ≥ 0,√
E[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2] ≤ a
√
E[‖xk − x∗‖2]+C4γk. Based on which, by using Lemma 3 we obtain the results.
2
3.3.3 Iteration and Oracle Complexity
We now establish the iteration, oracle and communication complexity of Algorithm 3 to achieve an −NE.
The derivation of the following theorem is almost the same as that of Theorem 5. So we just state the
results while omit the proof.
Theorem 6 Let E
[‖x0 − x∗‖2] ≤ C, Assumptions 3, 4(i), 4(iv), and 6 hold. Supoose a = ‖Γ‖ < 1 with
Γ defined by (41). Let Algorithm 3 be applied to Pagg, where τk = k + 1 and Sk =
⌈
C2r maxi ν
2
i
η2(k+1)
⌉
with
Cr , µµ2+L2a
(
1− La/
√
µ2 + L2a
)−1
for some η ∈ (0, 1). Let γ , max{η, β}, C4 and Q be defined in
Proposition 4. Suppose a 6= γ. Then the number of deterministic optimization solver required by player i
to obtain an −NE is bounded by K() ,
⌈
ln(Q/
√
)
ln(1/max{a,γ})
⌉
, while the communication and oracle complexity
to obtain an −NE are K()(K()+1)2 and O
(
(1/)
ln(1/η)
ln(1/max{a,γ})
)
.
Remark 3 (i) If the algorithm parameter η ∈ (max{a,√β}, 1), we obtain the optimal oracle complexity
O (1/).
(ii) From Theorem 6 we conclude that the iteration complexity in terms of the deterministic optimization
solver, oracle complexity in terms of sampled gradient, and communication complexity to compute an
-NE are O(ln(1/)), O ((1/)1+δ) with δ ≥ 0, and O (ln2(1/)), respectively.
(iii) Similarly to Corollary 3, when τk = d(k+ 1)ue and Sk = d(k + 1)ve for u ∈ (0, 1) and v > 0, we can
obtain the convergence rate E[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2] = O ((k + 1)−v) and establish that the iteration, communi-
cation, and oracle complexity to obtain an −NE are O((1/)1/v), O((1/)(u+1)/v), and O ((1/)1+1/v),
respectively. In fact, as done earlier, we may clarify the dependence of the constants on u and v.
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4 Numerical Simulations
In this section, we empirically validate the performance of the proposed algorithms on the networked
Nash-Cournot game [20, 22, 45], where firms compete in quantity produced. It is a classical example
of an aggregative game where the inverse-demand function depends on the sum of production by all
firms. We assume that there are n firms, regarded as the set of players N = {1, . . . , n} competing over
L spatially distributed markets (nodes) denoted by L = {1, · · · , L}. For any i, the ith firm needs to
determine a continuous-valued nonnegative quantity of products to be produced and delivered to the
markets, which is defined as xi = (x
1
i , · · · , xLi ) ∈ RL, where xli denotes the sales of firm i at the market
l. Furthermore, the ith firm is characterized by a random linear production cost function ci(xi; ξi) =
(ci + ξi)
∑L
l=1 x
l
i for some parameter ci > 0 where ξi is a mean-zero random variable. We further
assume that the price pl of products sold in market l ∈ L is determined by the linear inverse demand
(or price) function corrupted by noise pl(x¯l; ζl) = al + ζl − blx¯l, where x¯l =
∑n
i=1 x
l
i is the total sales
of products at the market l, the positive parameter al indicates the price when the production of the
good is zero, the positive parameter bl represents the slope of the inverse demand function, and the
random disturbance ζl is zero-mean. Consequently, firm i has an expectation-valued payoff function
defined as fi(x) = E
[
ci(xi; ξi) −
∑L
l=1 pl(x¯l; ζl)x
l
i
]
. Suppose firm i ∈ N has finite production capacity
Xi = {xi ∈ RL : xi ≥ 0, xli ≤ capil}. Then the objective of firm i is to find a feasible strategy that
optimizes its payoff, i.e., minxi∈Xi fi(xi, x−i).
Numerical settings. In the numerical study, we consider a network with n firms and L = 10
markets with the parameters in the payoffs set as al ∼ U(40, 50), bl ∼ U(1, 2), ci ∼ U(3, 5) for all i ∈ N
and l ∈ L, where U(u, u¯) denotes the uniform distribution over an interval [u, u¯] with u < u¯. In the
stochastic settings, the random variables are assumed to be ξi ∼ U(−ci/5, ci/5), ζl ∼ U(−al/5, al/5),
respectively. We further set capil = 2 ∀i ∈ N , l ∈ L.
We first validate the performance of the distributed VS-PGR (Alg. 1) scheme. We consider four
kinds of undirected connected graphs: (i) Cycle graph, which consists of a single cycle and every node
has exactly two edges incident with it; (ii) Star graph, where there is a center node connecting to all
every other node; (iii) Erdo˝s–Re´nyi graph, which is constructed by connecting nodes randomly and each
edge is included in the graph with probability 2/n independent from every other edge; (iv) Complete
graph, each node has an edge connecting it to every other node.We define a doubly stochastic matrix
A = [aij ]
n
i,j=1 with aii = 1− d(i)−1dmax , aij = 1dmax if (j, i) ∈ E and j 6= i, aij = 0, otherwise, where d(i) = |Ni|
denotes the number of neighbors of player i and dmax = maxi∈N d(i). We implement Algorithm 1 with
τk = dlog(k)e and Sk =
⌈
ρ−(k+1)
⌉
, and terminate it when the total number of samples utilized reached
106 and report the empirical error of E[‖xk−x
∗‖]
‖x∗‖ by averaging across 50 sample paths. The simulation
results are demonstrated in Table 3. As expected, Algorithm 1 with complete graph (namely centralized
VS-PGR) has fastest convergence rate and the empirical error at the termination increases with the
size of the network. It also indicates that the constant step-size should not be taken too large, otherwise
it might lead to non-convergence, see e.g. α = 0.02 in the case n = 50. We further display trajectories of
the iterates generated by the centralized VS-PGR scheme and its distributed variant over the ER graph.
Though the centralized has faster convergence rate than its distributed variant, it requires much more
rival information (or communications).
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α ρ n Cycle Star E-R Complete
0.01
0.98
20 3.16e-04 1.15e-01 7.5e-02 2.96e-04
50 1.55e-01 4.73e-01 3.68e-01 1.1e-03
0.985
20 1e-03 1.15e-01 7.47e-02 2.36e-04
50 1.49e-01 4.73e-01 3.67e-01 4.78e-04
0.02
0.98
0 9.07e-04 1.15e-01 7.47e-02 2.96e-04
50 2.67e-01 5.27e-01 4.37e-01 2.07e-01
0.985
20 1.2e-03 1.15e-01 7.47e-02 3.65e-04
50 2.67e-01 5.27e-01 4.37e-01 2.07e-01
Table 3: Empirical Error
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Figure 1: Trajectories
We now investigate how does the network structure influence the convergence properties. Set n = 20
and run Algorithm 1 over the cycle, star, and Erdo˝s–Re´nyi graphs with τk = k + 1, α = 0.01, and
Sk =
⌈
β−(k+1)
⌉
, where the network connectivity parameter β are respectively 0.967, 0.95, 0.986 for cycle,
star and ER graphs. The simulation results are demonstrated in Figure 2 with the left and right figure
respectively displaying the rate of convergence and oracle complexity. It is shown that the star graph
with β = 0.95 has the fastest convergence rate while the ER graph with β = 0.986 has the slowest
convergence rate, this is consistent with Theorem 3 that smaller β may lead to faster rate of convergence
(since γ = β). It is also worth noting that for obtaining an -NE, the ER graph requires the smallest
number of samples, while the star graph has the worst oracle complexity. These findings support the
theoretic results in Theorem 4 that larger β may lead to better oracle complexity.
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Figure 2: Rate of convergence and oracle complexity of Algorithm 1
We then run the VS-PGR algorithm (namely, Algorithm 1 over a complete graph) with geometrically
and polynomially increasing sample-sizes and demonstrate the results in Figure 3. The results in Fig.
3(a) show the rate of convergence, implying that with a small number of proximal evaluations there
is no big difference on convergence rate, while the algorithm with geometrically increasing sample-size
will outperform the algorithm with polynomially increasing sample-size if more proximal evaluations are
available. Fig. 3(b) and Fig. 3(c) demonstrate the total number of samples required to obtain an -NE,
where it is shown in Fig. 3(b) that with low accuracy  the polynomial sample-size with smaller degree v
appears to have better oracle complexity, while for a high accuracy , the geometrically and polynomially
increasing (with larger v) sample-size may have better oracle complexity. The numerical results are
consistent with the discussions in Remark 1.
Comparison with stochastic gradient descent (SGD): We set n = 20 and compare Algorithm 1 and
SGD by running both schemes over the Erdo˝s–Re´nyi graph up to 106 samples. We show the results
in Table 4 and Figure 4, where SGD-t denotes the minibatch SGD algorithm that utilizes t samples at
each iteration while in Algorithm 1 we set Sk =
⌈
β−(k+1)/2
⌉
and τk = k + 1. Though it is seen from
Table 4 that SGD can obtain slightly better empirical error, Algorithm 1 can significantly reduce the
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Figure 3: VS-PGR with geometrically and polynomially increasing sample-size
computation time and the rounds of communication. We can also observe from the iteration complexity
bounds demonstrated in Figure 4 that Algorithm 1 requires fewer proximal evaluations than SGD for
approximating an NE with the same accuracy.
Alg. 1
SGD-16
τk = ln(k)
SGD-8
τk = ln(k)
emp.err 5.74e-04 2.58e-04 2.48e-4
prox.eval 469 6.25e+4 1.25e+5
comm. 1.11e+5 6.55e+5 1.41e+6
CPU(s) 1.8 14.67 28.76
Table 4: Comparison of Alg.1 and SGD
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Figure 4: Iteration Complex-
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Figure 5: Rate of Alg. 3
We now validate the performance of the distributed VS-PBR scheme. Suppose that for each
firm i, there exists a random quadratic production cost function ci(xi; ξi) = (ci + ξi)
∑L
l=1 x
l
i +
ρi
2 x
T
i xi
for some ci > 0 and random disturbance ξi with mean zero. Assume that λmin(ρiIL + 2diag(b)) >
(n− 1)λmax(diag(b)) ∀i ∈ N . Then by the definition of Γ in (41), ‖Γ‖∞ < 1 and thus the proximal BR
map is contractive. Set n = 13, L = 6, and capil = 2 ∀i ∈ N , l ∈ L. We then run Algorithm 3 with
τk = dlog(k)e, µ = 20, and Sk =
⌈
0.98−(k+1)
⌉
, and demonstrate the convergence rate in Fig. 5, showing
that a better network connectivity may lead to a faster rate.
Comparison of distributed VS-PBR and VS-PGR. Let the network be randomly generated by the
Erdo˝s–Re´nyi graph. We run Alg. 1 with α = 0.04 and Alg. 3 with µ = 30, where τk = k + 1 and
Sk =
⌈
0.98−(k+1)
⌉
. The numerical results for both schemes are shown in Figure 6, from which it is seen
that distributed VS-PBR has faster convergence rate since it requires solving a deterministic optimization
problem per iteration while distributed VS-PGR merely takes a proximal gradient step. Furthermore,
the demonstrated oracle and communication complexity show that distributed VS-PBR necessitates less
samples and communication rounds than distributed VS-PGR to obtain an -NE.
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Figure 6: Comparison of distributed VS-PBR and VS-PGR.
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5 Concluding Remarks
Stochastic Nash games and their networked variants represent an important generalization of deter-
ministic Nash games. While there have been recent advances in the computation of equilibria in both
distributed and stochastic regimes, at least three gaps currently exist in the available rate statements:
(i) Gap between between rate statements for deterministic and stochastic Nash games; (ii) Little avail-
able by way of implementable best-response schemes in stochastic regimes; (iii) Lack of computational,
oracle, and communication complexity statements for distributed gradient and best-response schemes.
Motivated by these gaps, we consider four distinct schemes for the resolution of a class of stochastic con-
vex Nash games where each player-specific objective is a sum of an expectation-valued smooth function
and a convex nonsmooth function: (i) VS-PGR scheme for strongly monotone stochastic Nash games;
(ii) VS-PBR for stochastic Nash games with contractive proximal BR maps, (iii) Distributed VS-PGR
for strongly monotone aggregative Nash games, and (iv) Distributed VS-PBR for stochastic aggregative
games with contractive proximal BR maps. Under suitable geometrically increasing sample-size and lin-
early increasing consensus steps for the distributed variants, we show that all schemes generate sequences
that converge at the (optimal) geometric rate and derive bounds on the computational, oracle, and
communication complexity. We further quantify the rate and complexity bounds of the schemes when
the sample-sizes and the rounds of communications increase at prescribed polynomial rates.
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